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DOES IT PAY TO BE A MANAGER?
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MANAGER
RULE IN ANALYZING RETALIATION
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
CRISTINA GIAPPONE†
INTRODUCTION
Retaliation by employers in the workforce is a recurring
issue in today’s society. Retaliation claims in the workplace are
becoming more frequent and common. According to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the number of
retaliation charges filed annually with the agency has grown
considerably, with approximately 22.6% of EEOC charge filings
in the 1997 fiscal year to 44.5% in the 2015 fiscal year being
retaliation based.1
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) to protect employees in the workplace “from
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of certain protected
statuses.”2 However, the question remains whether employees
who serve in a managerial role engage in a protected activity
under Title VII when they oppose the actions of their employer in
the normal course of their job responsibilities.
Courts are split on whether employees must step outside
their role as managers and assert their own adverse employment
action against their employer to have engaged in protected
activity under Title VII.3 This requirement is known as the
†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2013, Marist College. I thank my
family for their unconditional love and support.
1
Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2017).
2
LISA J. BANKS & SAM KRAMER, A.L.I., Emerging Issues in Anti-Discrimination
Law, SX021 ALI-CLE 275 § 1 (2016).
3
Compare DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the manager rule does not apply to Title VII claims), with Brush v. Sears
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“manager rule.”4 The question of whether to apply the manager
rule to retaliation claims under Title VII is significant because it
will determine whether employees will be discouraged from
bringing such claims or will feel empowered to do so; whether
employees will face a challenge in bringing a claim;5 or whether
employers will be bombarded with a plethora of claims.6
In 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit issued an opinion on the manager rule as it applies to
Title VII that created a circuit split with a 2012 decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.7 In
DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, the Fourth Circuit held that the
“ ‘manager rule’ has no place in Title VII jurisprudence.”8 Basing
its reasoning on the differing language between the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Title VII, as well as Supreme Court
precedent, the court refused to apply the manager rule in the
Title VII context.9 But, in Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., the
Eleventh Circuit found the manager rule, as defined in the FLSA
context in McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc.,10 persuasive and applied it
against certain individuals trying to recover under Title VII.11
This Note argues that the manager rule should be applied to
Title VII cases but in a new and very specific and detailed
context involving a case-by-case analysis, similar to that of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
in Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. This Note is
comprised of three parts. Part I provides the history of Title VII
generally, and discusses the emergence of the manager rule in
the FLSA context. Part II addresses how different federal circuit
Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the manager rule
applies to Title VII claims and employees must cross the line from being an
employee completing her normal responsibilities to an employee filing a personal
complaint against her employer).
4
McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996).
5
DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423 (“First, under the balancing test adopted by this
Circuit . . . an employer may not be liable under Title VII if an employee’s conduct at
work is sufficiently ‘insubordinate, disruptive, or nonproductive.’ . . . Second, the
Supreme Court has provided employers with an affirmative defense under certain
circumstances when an employee fails to report and to take advantage of an
employer’s internal investigation processes.”).
6
Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008).
7
Compare DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 424, with Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787.
8
DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 413.
9
Id. at 422–24.
10
McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996).
11
Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787.
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courts have either recognized or rejected the manager rule as it
applies to retaliation claims in the Title VII context. Part III
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of the manager rule and
proposes a solution that the manager rule should be applied to
Title VII cases using a case-by-case analysis similar to that of the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosenfield.
I.

THE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MANAGER RULE

A.

Legal Background of Title VII

Title VII is a federal law created to “protect[] employees from
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of certain protected
statuses.”12 The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, § 704(a),
provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing . . . .

Within the anti-retaliation provision are two different clauses
that are important to distinguish: the oppositional clause and the
participatory clause.13 Oppositional activity involves opposing
one of the practices that is “made an unlawful employment
practice by Title VII,” while participatory activity involves
participating in “any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under Title VII.”14 The two clauses offer different
amounts of statutory protection.15
In general, to establish a prima facie claim for retaliation
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show the following: “(1) that [he]
engaged in a protected activity, as well as (2) that [his] employer
took an adverse employment action against [him], and (3) that

12

BANKS & KRAMER, A.L.I., supra note 2, § 1.
Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 66–67 (2012).
14
Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 896 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).
15
Oberti, supra note 13, at 67; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (“Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide
broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which
accomplishment of the Act's primary objective depends.”).
13
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there was a causal link between the two events.”16 Specifically,
to be protected under the oppositional clause, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he opposed a practice that formed the
statutorily prohibited discrimination.17 A plaintiff can still
receive the protection of the statute without showing that the
practice he opposed was definitively a violation of the statute.18
A plaintiff’s opposition to the unlawful conduct need only be
based on a reasonable and good-faith belief that the practice
violated the statute.19 Therefore, a plaintiff’s opposition will not
be protected by the statute if a court finds the belief to be
“objectively unreasonable” or the plaintiff does not “honestly
believe” that a practice he is opposing is prohibited by statute.20
The United States Supreme Court case, Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, is the seminal case that
provides guidance on the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.21
In Burlington, the plaintiff, a female who was hired as a track
laborer,22 claimed that her employer retaliated against her in
violation of Title VII when her job responsibilities were changed
and when she was suspended for thirty-seven days without back
pay.23
The Supreme Court held that the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII is not solely limited to workplace conduct.24
Additionally, the Court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate

16
DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
17
O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
Oberti, supra note 13, at 67.
18
O’Leary, 657 F.3d at 631.
19
Id.
20
Id.; see also Oberti, supra note 13, at 67.
21
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006); see also
David Long-Daniels & Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation Claims,
28 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 437, 439 (2013) (“For the last six years, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White has been
synonymous with Title VII retaliation.”).
22
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57.
23
Id. at 59. She was suspended because her immedaite supervisor claimed that
she was being insubordinate. However, her company later determined that she had
not been insubordinate and reinstated her to her position and awarded her backpay
for the thirty-seven days she was suspended. Subsequently, she filed a retaliation
charge based on her suspension. Id. at 58–59.
24
Id. at 67 (“The scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond
workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”); see also LongDaniels & Hall, supra note 21, at 440 (“The Supreme Court first reasoned that
retaliation claims, unlike discrimination claims, are not limited to workplace
conduct.”).
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that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well
might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” ’ ”25 Therefore, under this
broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, a plaintiff
can successfully assert a claim of retaliation under Title VII so
long as the purported action would have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.26
The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government
of Nashville & Davidson County27 discussed whether the
protection of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII applies to
an employee who does not voluntarily discuss the issue of
discrimination, but rather does so while answering questions
during an employer’s internal investigation.28 In that case, the
plaintiff, who was an employee of a school district, did not
necessarily have any managerial responsibilities.29 The plaintiff
was asked by a human resources officer whether she had on any
occasion witnessed inappropriate behavior of another employee.30
After describing situations in which she did witness several
instances of sexually harassing behavior, the plaintiff was fired.31
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a retaliation claim under Title VII,
arguing that her employer fired her for reporting the behavior
during the internal investigation.32
The Supreme Court held that the protection of the antiretaliation provision of Title VII does extend to an employee who
discusses an issue of discrimination while answering questions
during an employer’s internal investigation.33 To arrive at this
conclusion, the Court looked at the definition of “oppose” within
the statute and applied its ordinary meaning, which is “to resist
25
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219
(D.C. Cir. 2006)).
26
Id. at 69–70 (“By focusing on the materiality of the challenged action and the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, we believe this standard
will screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to
dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about
discrimination.”).
27
555 U.S. 271 (2009).
28
Id. at 273.
29
Id. at 274.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 273.
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or antagonize . . . ; to contend against; to confront; resist;
withstand.”34 According to the Court, the plaintiff’s descriptions
of the employee’s behavior would qualify as “resistant” or
“antagonistic.”35 Essentially, “[w]hen an employee communicates
to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a
form of employment discrimination, that communication
virtually always constitutes the employee’s opposition to the
activity.”36 One does not have to be active to oppose an action or
behavior.37
Therefore, the plaintiff’s conduct of reporting the
discrimination to her boss during questioning rather than on her
own initiative was considered opposition and was covered by the
clause.38 According to the Court, there is nothing in the statute
that would require “a freakish rule” that would protect an
employee who voluntarily reports discrimination but not one who
reports the discrimination when asked a question.39 There is
nothing in the statute’s text or precedent that supports the
“catch–22” of the employer punishing the employee for reporting
the discrimination or having the employer “escape liability [by]
arguing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
[any discrimination] promptly but the . . . employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of . . . preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer.”40

34
Id. at 276 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1957)).
35
Id.
36
Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
37
Id. at 277 (“ ‘Oppose’ goes beyond ‘active, consistent’ behavior in ordinary
discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has
taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.”).
38
Id. at 280; see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA
L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) [hereinafter Retaliation in EEO Office] (“While the Court’s
decision was essential to protect the rights of employee-witnesses in internal
investigations, it does nothing for the employees charged with responsibility for
handling the investigation.”).
39
Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277–78; see also Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying
Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection of Fault, Duty, and Causation, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1409–10 (2014) [hereinafter Tortifying Retaliation] (“Calling the
rule proposed by the employer ‘freakish,’ the Court exhibited sensitivity to the
unfairness of a legal framework that would reward employers for adopting antidiscrimination policies but allow them to retaliate against the employees who
participate in them.”).
40
Crawford, 555 U.S. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Emergence of the “Manager Rule”

The emergence of the “manager rule” has become a contested
issue in the retaliation context. The manager rule was first
introduced under retaliation claims in the Fair Labor Standards
Act context.41 Under the FLSA, it is unlawful for any person:
[T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an
industry committee.42

According to the manager rule, an employee who is involved
in management does not engage in a “protected activity” when he
or she contests or differs in opinion with the actions of his or her
employer.43 To qualify as engaging in protected activity, an
employee must “cross the line from being an employee
‘performing her job . . . to an employee lodging a personal
complaint.’ ”44
The leading case showing how the manager rule is used to
limit the scope of protected activity is McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc.,
a Tenth Circuit FLSA case decided in 1996.45 The plaintiff, a
personnel director responsible for, among other things,
monitoring compliance with wage and hour laws, filed suit
against her employer.46 She asserted an FLSA retaliatory

41

McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996).
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).
43
Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1478).
44
Id.; see also Colin R. Hagan, Client Update: “Manager Rule” Not the Rule in
Fourth Circuit, SHLANSKY LAW GROUP (July 1, 2014), http://www.slglawfirm.com/
Assets/ManagerRule_20140701.pdf.
The “manager rule” gives employers an increasingly-recognized defense
against discrimination or retaliation claims based on facts that suggest the
employee was doing his or her job. Employees are on notice that they must
register some personal opposition to the employment practice at issue by
participating in the identification or investigation of discrimination when it
is not within their job description to do so, or expressing some disapproval
of an employment practice. In courts that apply the “manager rule,” it is
often not enough for a plaintiff to relay only the complaint of another
employee, especially if the plaintiff is a manager, who might be the first
person to whom an employee’s complaints are aired.
45
McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996); see also
Retaliation in EEO Office, supra note 38, at 17.
46
McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1481.
42
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discharge claim for being terminated after reporting possible
company FLSA violations.47 The Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s
retaliation claim on the ground that she was acting within her
job responsibilities.48 According to the court, the plaintiff did not
initiate a FLSA claim on her own behalf or on behalf of anyone
else but rather only informed the company that others might
institute FLSA claims against it.49 The court explained that for
the plaintiff to be protected from retaliation, she must “step
outside . . . her role of representing the company and either file
(or threaten to file) an action adverse to the employer.”50 Because
plaintiff was merely performing her job requirements by
monitoring wage and hour issues, she did not step outside of her
role and thus was not protected under the statute.51
The Fifth Circuit in Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C.,52
adopted the manager rule and also applied it in the FLSA
context.53 In Hagan, the plaintiff was a field service manager
who was in charge of a group of technicians.54 After the plaintiff
was terminated, he filed a claim against his employer that he
was retaliated against in violation of the anti-retaliation
provisions of the FLSA.55 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that
he was retaliated against for personally opposing a change to the
field technicians’ schedule because it would possibly reduce their
overtime pay.56 The plaintiff also argued that he was retaliated
against for forwarding his technicians’ questions to the Human
Resources department on whether the change in schedule was
legal or not.57
The Fifth Circuit relied on McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc. and
held that the plaintiff did not “ ‘step outside the role’ of manager”
when he passed along his technicians’ question to the Human
Resources department about the legality of the schedule change,
and his actions were therefore not considered protected activity.58
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 1487.
Id.
Id. at 1486.
Id. at 1487.
529 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630.
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The Fifth Circuit took the position that without the manager
rule, almost all of the activities that a manager performs during
the course of his employment would be considered protected
activity.59
Without the manager rule, a normal at-will
employment relationship could result in a “litigation minefield.”60
The first appearance of the manager rule in the Title VII
context occurred in the Eighth Circuit case, EEOC v. HBE
Corp..61 One of the plaintiffs had been a director of personnel for
a hotel corporation.62 When the corporate director of personnel
asked the plaintiff to fire another employee, the plaintiff refused
because he believed the decision to fire the employee was racially
motivated.63 Subsequently, the plaintiff was discharged and filed
complaints with the EEOC, which decided to file a lawsuit under
Title VII on the plaintiff’s behalf.64 After a jury award for the
plaintiff,65 the employer argued on appeal that the plaintiff did
not step outside his normal responsibilities in opposing the
discharge of the other employee.66 The court looked to the
language of McKenzie67 to decide whether the plaintiff “ ‘step[ped]
outside’ his employment role.”68 The court recognized that
“stepping outside” one’s normal employment role entails taking
“some action against a discrimination policy.”69 The court then
distinguished the actions of the plaintiff in McKenzie from the
plaintiff’s actions.70 The court held that the plaintiff “stepped
outside” his normal managerial role by refusing to implement a

59
Id. at 628 (“If we did not require an employee to ‘step outside the role’ or
otherwise make clear to the employer that the employee was taking a position
adverse to the employer, nearly every activity in the normal course of a manager's
job would potentially be protected activity under Section 215(a)(3).”).
60
Id. “[G]roups of employees—management employees, human resources
employees, and legal employees, to name a few—[would] be[] difficult to discharge
without fear of a lawsuit.” Id.
61
135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998).
62
Id. at 549.
63
Id. at 550.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 554.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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discriminatory company policy, whereas the plaintiff in McKenzie
only notified management of possible violations of the law so that
the company would not face liability.71
II. DIFFERENT CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS ON THE APPLICATION
OF THE “MANAGER RULE” TO TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and many
courts have rejected the applications of the manager rule. The
EEOC has opined on the application of the manager rule in its
newly proposed enforcement guidance on retaliation and related
issues.72 It concludes that the manager rule has no place in
relation to the opposition clause of Title VII.73 According to the
EEOC, “Opposition encompasses employee exposure of, and
objection to, perceived discrimination, even when those who
engage in the opposition are managers, human resources
personnel or other internal EEO compliance advisors to an
employer.”74 Some examples of protected opposition offered by
the EEOC include:
[C]omplaining about alleged discrimination against oneself or
others, or threatening to complain; providing information in an
employer’s internal investigation of an EEO matter; refusing to
obey an order reasonably believed to be discriminatory; advising
an employer on EEO compliance; resisting sexual advances or
intervening to protect others; passive resistance (allowing
others to express opposition); and requesting reasonable
accommodation for disability or religion.75

71
Id.; see also Retaliation in EEO Office, supra note 38, at 25 (discussing how
the court in EEOC v. HBE Corp. “manipulate[d] the employer ‘policy’ in order to find
that the plaintiff acted . . . in ‘opposition’ to the employer . . . However, the court did
not acknowledge that its analysis turned on what it credited as the company
‘policy’—the written nondiscrimination policy, which the plaintiff acted to further, or
the allegedly discriminatory actions taken by high-level employees (and in violation
of the official nondiscrimination policy) which the plaintiff opposed.”).
72
See generally U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Proposed Enforcement
Guide on Retaliation and Related Issues (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
guidance/retaliation-guidance.cfm.
73
Id. at 13. (“The EEOC and the U.S. Department of Labor have rejected the socalled ‘manager rule’ adopted by some courts . . . .”).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 25.
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The EEOC defines the scope of the protection of the opposition
clause by stating that the “manner of opposition be reasonable”
and that the opposition must be based on a “reasonable and good
faith belief that the opposed practice is unlawful.”76
The federal circuit courts apply the manager rule in an
inconsistent manner. The Fourth, Second, and Sixth Circuits
have explicitly rejected the application of the manager rule to
Title VII cases.77 Conversely, in unpublished opinions, the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits have openly accepted the manager rule
and applied it in Title VII cases.78
A.

The Rejection of the Manager Rule

The Fourth Circuit in DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic rejected
applying the manager rule to Title VII cases.79 In that case, an
employee informed the plaintiff that he had been harassed in the
workplace and the plaintiff offered his opinion that the employee
was a victim of sexual harassment and assisted the employee
with the reporting and investigation.80 After the employee
complained that the employer was not handling the situation
properly, the plaintiff believed that the management and human
resources (“HR”) department had been mishandling the
employee’s complaints and contacted the HR manager to relay
his opinion.81 After the employee filed a Title VII complaint
against the employer and during settlement negotiations, the
plaintiff was terminated because he had not acted in the best
interests of the company when handling the employee’s sexual
harassment complaints.82 The plaintiff then filed a complaint
alleging that the defendant terminated his employment in
violation of Title VII’s opposition clause.83

76

Id. at 16.
See DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 424 (4th Cir. 2015); Littlejohn
v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 318 (2d Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir. 2000).
78
See Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 F. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2012);
Weeks v. Kansas, 503 F. App’x 640, 642 (10th Cir. 2012).
79
See DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 424.
80
Id. at 413.
81
Id. at 414.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 415.
77
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The Fourth Circuit held that the manager rule does not
apply to Title VII claims.84 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit
analyzed the difference between the FLSA anti-retaliation
provision and the Title VII opposition clause, noting that the
FLSA “is far more constricted than the broad range of conduct
protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.”85 Also, the
court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent goes against
restricting the coverage of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision,86
and there was never an “endorse[ment] [of] a categorical
exception based on an employee’s workplace duties.”87
Additionally, the court analyzed the affirmative defense that the
Supreme Court has provided to employers, known as the
Faragher/Ellerth defense.88 In sum, the court warned that the
application of the manager rule in Title VII cases would have
employees in a managerial position “receive no protection from
Title VII if they oppose discrimination targeted at the employees
that they are duty-bound to protect.”89
The manager rule was also rejected for Title VII claims by
the Second Circuit.90 In Littlejohn v. City of New York, the
plaintiff was a director of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Office at the New York City Administration for Children’s
Services and conducted investigations of discrimination claims as
one of her responsibilities.91 The plaintiff claimed that she was
84

Id. at 422.
Id.
86
The Supreme Court in Burlington held that the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII “provide[s] broad protection from retaliation.” Id. at 422 (quoting
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)). Additionally the
Court in Crawford intended the provision to cover various types of conduct where an
“employee communicates to an employer the employee’s ‘belief that the employer has
engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination.’ ” Id. (quoting Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009)).
87
Id. at 423.
88
Id.; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998);
Burlington Indus., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Faragher and Ellerth hold
“[a]n employer . . . subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with . . . authority over the
employee.” Crawford, 555 U.S. at 272 (first quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; then
quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765). To overcome liability, the employer must show
“1) that it acted reasonably to prevent and correct harassment; and 2) that the
plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to prevent or mitigate harm.” Retaliation in
EEO Office, supra note 38, at 4.
89
DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423.
90
See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015).
91
Id. at 303.
85
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retaliated against because she complained about racial
discrimination in the personnel decision-making process during a
department merger.92
The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s employment
status did not preclude her from participating in protected
activities under the opposition clause of Title VII.93 The court
looked at the plain language of Title VII’s opposition clause and
determined that it “does not distinguish among entry-level
employees, managers, and any other type of employee.”94 The
court held that merely “reporting or investigating by itself is not
a protected activity under [Title VII’s] opposition clause, because
merely to convey others’ complaints of discrimination is not to
oppose practices made unlawful by Title VII.”95 However, if an
employee who is tasked with investigating and reporting
complaints of discrimination “actively supports other employees
in asserting their Title VII rights or personally complains or is
critical about the discriminatory employment practices of her
employer, that employee has engaged in a protected activity”
under Title VII’s opposition clause.96
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. University of
Cincinnati rejected the application of the manager rule as it
applied to Title VII claims.97 The plaintiff was the Vice President
of Human Resources and Human Relations at the University of
Cincinnati,98 who claimed that he was retaliated against for his
advocacy efforts, on behalf of women and minorities, that were in
opposition to his employer’s alleged discriminatory employment
practices.99 The court held that even though the plaintiff had a
duty to come forward with his concerns, his actions were still
protected under Title VII’s opposition clause.100 Relying on the
guidance of the EEOC, according to the court, “the only
qualification that is placed upon an employee’s invocation of
protection from retaliation under Title VII’s opposition clause is

92

Id. at 315.
Id. at 316.
94
Id. at 318.
95
Id.
96
Id. (quoting Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
97
See Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000).
98
Id. at 566.
99
Id. at 579.
100
Id.
93
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that the manner of his opposition must be reasonable.”101
Therefore, the employee’s job status or to whom the complaint is
made is insignificant, as long as “the manner of [that] opposition”
is “reasonable.”102
B.

The Application of the Manager Rule

On the other hand, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have
applied the manager rule to claims under Title VII.103 In Weeks
v. Kansas, the Tenth Circuit applied the manager rule in a case
where the plaintiff, a lawyer, believed she was terminated in
retaliation under Title VII for reporting two allegations of
unlawful termination to her employer and “advis[ing] him to take
them seriously.”104 The court held that for plaintiff to have
engaged in protected activity, she “must do more than provide
legal advice to her employer on how best to resolve a claim of
discrimination asserted by another employee.”105 The court
reiterated the manager rule as described in McKenzie that the
plaintiff must step outside her role to engage in protected activity
under Title VII.106
In Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., the Eleventh Circuit also
applied the manager rule in a Title VII claim.107 After a fellow
employee reported to plaintiff, a Loss Prevention District Coach,
that she had been raped, the plaintiff alerted her employer and

101

Id. at 580.
Id.
103
Weeks v. Kansas, 503 F. App’x 640 (10th Cir. 2012); Brush v. Sears Holdings
Corp., 466 F. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Correa v. Mana Prods. Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 2d 319, 322–23, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). In Correa, plaintiff was a human
resources manager who claimed she was fired in retaliation under Title VII for
complaining of her employer’s unlawful discriminatory practices and participating in
internal company investigations. Correa, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 322. The court reasoned
that the plaintiff did not step outside her role as human resource manager and did
not file or threaten to file an action against her employer. Id. at 331. The plaintiff’s
investigation of complaints was a part of her job description and not outside the
scope of her employment. Id. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to
show that she was engaged in protected activity. Id.; see also Retaliation in EEO
Office, supra note 38, at 20 (“The Correa court’s reasoning gives employers a wide
berth to pressure the employees in charge of EEO compliance into discouraging and
minimizing complaints, rewarding them when complaints go away and punishing
them when they do not.”).
104
Weeks, 503 F. App’x at 641.
105
Id. at 642.
106
Id.
107
See Brush, 466 F. App’x at 781.
102
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urged them to notify law enforcement.108 After the plaintiff’s
employer refused to report the alleged rape, the plaintiff kept
insisting on informing law enforcement, which resulted in her
subsequent termination.109
The plaintiff alleged that she was dismissed in retaliation for
opposing the nature of the investigation of the sexual harassment
claim.110 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s behavior
in disagreeing with the way in which her employer conducted an
investigation did not constitute protected activity under Title
VII.111 According to the court, the plaintiff was tasked with
conducting an internal investigation and was “neither the
aggrieved nor accused party” in the matter.112
The court
reasoned that it did not want to extend the reasoning of
Crawford to “all individuals involved in the investigation of that
discrimination, no matter how far distant.”113 Crawford involved
the reporting of a harassment claim where the reporting occurred
during a solicited internal investigation by the employer.114 The
case did not comment on whether a third party could use a
harassment claim as a foundation for its own action under Title
VII.115 The Eleventh Circuit held that the manager rule applied
and the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity under Title
VII.116 The court held that by informing the employer of the
harassment claims, investigating the allegations, and reporting
the findings, the plaintiff was merely performing her
responsibilities as a manager and did not assert any rights under
Title VII or take any adverse actions against her employer

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 788.
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during the investigation.117
“Disagreement with internal
procedures does not equate with ‘protected activity’ opposing
discriminatory practices.”118
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF THE MANAGER RULE AND A
RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
The manager rule should continue to be applied in Title VII
cases but in a new and very specific and detailed manner that
tracks the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in the FLSA case Rosenfield
v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.119
A. Middle Ground Approach Taken by the Ninth Circuit
The court in Rosenfield looked to the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
for guidance.120 In Kasten, the plaintiff claimed that his employer
discharged him in an unlawful retaliation for orally complaining
to officials about the location of the timeclocks.121 The plaintiff
argued that the location of the timeclocks prevented workers
from receiving time credit for the time that they spent putting on
and taking off protective work gear.122 The question presented to
the Supreme Court was “whether an oral complaint of a violation
of the [FLSA] is protected conduct under the [FLSA’s] antiretaliation provision.”123

117
Id. at 787; see also Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 60,
61–62 (D.P.R. 2005). In Vidal, the plaintiff was a human resources director who told
his employer that he was investigating sexual harassment complaints made by other
employees against the company. Id. at 61. That same day, the plaintiff was
terminated in what he alleged was retaliation for investigating the complaints. Id.
The court held that plaintiff did not have a claim under Title VII. The court
reasoned that the plaintiff was simply performing his normal job responsibilities and
in accordance with his employer’s policies forbidding sexual harassment. Id. at 62.
The court discussed how the plaintiff’s actions were not considered adverse to his
employer and were part of his regular job duties. Id. Thus, the plaintiff’s actions
were not considered as engaging in protected activity under Title VII. Id.
118
Brush, 466 F. App’x at 787. “Under such circumstances, the breadth of
Crawford’s application to individuals who suffered workplace discrimination is not
transferable to the entirety of the management string that might review any such
allegation.” Id. at 787–88.
119
811 F.3d 282 (9th Cir. 2015).
120
See id. at 285–88.
121
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 5 (2011).
122
Id. at 4–5.
123
Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress did not intend to limit the protection that the
FLSA offers and that limiting the provision’s coverage to solely
written complaints would defeat that objective.124 In addition to
finding that oral complaints are included in the phrase “filed any
complaint” in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision,125 the
Supreme Court also established another important ruling about
complaints in this context.
Although oral complaints are
included within the scope of the Act, the Act is also meant “to
establish an enforcement system that is fair to employers.”126
The FLSA contains a fair notice element to employers.127 To be
considered a valid complaint within the anti-retaliation
provision, “a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for
a reasonable employer to understand it . . . as an assertion of
rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”128
In Rosenfield, the plaintiff was the Director of Human
Resources and Corporate Training for her employer.129
Throughout the plaintiff’s employment, she consistently reported
to her superiors that the company was not complying with the
FLSA, and she sought to change this in order to comply with the
statutory requirements of the statute.130 The plaintiff was
subsequently fired and alleged that her employer fired her
because she had engaged in the protected activity under the
FLSA of complaining to her superiors about the company’s
failure to comply with the FLSA.131
The Ninth Circuit in Rosenfield was concerned with whether
the managerial status of the plaintiff affected whether her
complaint was within the scope of the “filed any complaint”
phrase of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA.132 The
Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s managerial status “form[s]

124

Id. at 11.
Id. at 17.
126
Id. at 13.
127
Id. at 14 (“As such, the phrase ‘filed any complaint’ contemplates some
degree of formality, certainly to the point where the recipient has been given fair
notice that a grievance has been lodged and does, or should, reasonably understand
the matter as part of its business concerns.”).
128
Id.
129
Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enters. Inc., 811 F.3d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 2015).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
125
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an important part of th[e] context.”133 The court looked at the
differences between managers and their employee counterparts
in terms of job responsibilities.134 Specifically, employers expect
managers to disclose “work-related concerns” and to make
suggestions for “changes in policy.”135 Employers may not
consider these reports to be “complaints” but rather the manager
performing his or her normal duties and responsibilities.136 On
the other hand, when entry-level employees voice such concerns,
employers would most certainly recognize such a report as a
“complaint” since it is not a part of their duties to do so.137
Therefore, the court held that in determining whether a
managerial employee has filed a complaint, his or her role as a
manager is an essential element of the analysis but is not the
sole factor to be considered.138 Looking at the fair notice rule
established in Kasten and considering the managerial status of
the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff’s advocacy of the
rights of other employees could be considered by her employer as
filing any type of complaint within the meaning of the FLSA.139
The question of whether fair notice was given to an employer is
determined “on a case-by-case basis.”140
In terms of the
managerial status of the employee, the court refused to create a
bright-line rule in deciding whether a manager “filed any
complaint” within the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.141
B.

Benefits of the Manager Rule

There are numerous benefits and drawbacks to applying the
manager rule in the Title VII context. In terms of the benefits,
without the manager rule, some employees would have a basis
for a retaliation claim just by performing their job

133

Id. at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 287.
139
Id. at 288.
140
Id. at 287 (“Because Kasten requires consideration of the content and context
of an alleged FLSA complaint, the question of fair notice must be resolved on a caseby-case basis.”).
141
Id. at 284, 287 (“An employee’s managerial position is only one
consideration . . . .”).
134
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responsibilities.142
Therefore, employers who are trying to
discipline their employees for reasons unrelated to reporting
discrimination claims could be frivolously sued.143 This would
make it very challenging for employers to discipline their
employees without fear of being sued for retaliation.144
Connected to this point is that without the manager rule, there
would likely be an increase in the amount of retaliation claims
brought under Title VII which, in turn, could “open up the
litigation floodgates.”145
Some have countered that being able to bring a retaliation
claim is much different than being able to prove it.146 To prevail
under Title VII, employees would still have to establish a
connection between the protected activity that they engaged in
and the resulting adverse employment action that ensued.147
Retaliation claims are the most difficult type of discrimination
claims for employers to defend successfully, precisely because
employees will most likely be able to establish the causation
element of a retaliation claim.148 In terms of an economic and
financial aspect, without the manager rule, opening the

142
See Patrick Dorrian, Should Special Retaliation Rule Apply to Managers,
HR?, BLOOMBERG: BNA (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.bna.com/special-retaliation-rulen57982066739 (“[E]mployees might be able to build a retaliation claim just by doing
their job, making it risky to discipline them when it's otherwise appropriate to do
so.”).
143
See Tortifying Retaliation, supra note 39, at 1401 (“Courts’ embrace of the
manager rule reflects a legitimate concern that, without it, employers would lose the
ability to supervise job performance for some segment of the workforce.”).
144
Id. (“The fundamental problem driving the manager rule is that, when part
of the employee’s job is to oversee compliance with anti-discrimination law, the
search for a retaliatory motive cannot separate the illegitimate motive of retaliation
from the legitimate motive of job performance.”).
145
Dorrian, supra note 142; see also Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529
F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008) (“An otherwise typical at-will employment relationship
could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield, with whole groups of employees—
management employees, human resources employees, and legal employees, to name
a few—being difficult to discharge without fear of a lawsuit.”).
146
See Dorrian, supra note 142.
147
See id.
148
See id. (“Because these employees often are regularly engaged in taking or
otherwise acting on bias complaints, an adverse action taken against them by their
employer at any time might be seen—just from the close timing of events alone—as
linked to that activity.”); see also Carol Patton, Revisiting the ‘Manager Rule,’ HUM.
RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE
/view/story.jhtml?id=534359834, (“Retaliation claims are horrible in that it’s so easy
to bring one and difficult to defend.”).
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floodgates of litigation could result in large and significant costs
to the employers even in situations where employers are not
found liable and where monetary damages are not awarded.149
C.

Drawbacks of the Manager Rule

One drawback to the manager rule is that it might cause
employees to be afraid of expressing their concerns about
discrimination that they believe is occurring in the workplace,150
creating a chilling effect.
Another negative aspect of the
manager rule is the “catch–22” scenario expressed in
DeMasters.151 If the manager rule is applied in the Title VII
context, then employees are more likely to remain silent which,
in turn, would make victims of such discrimination less inclined
to use internal investigation mechanisms already established in
their workplaces.152
By not taking advantage of these
mechanisms, employers would be able to use the
Faragher/Ellerth defense153 to escape liability, which could make
for fewer successful claims and let them go unresolved.154
Another drawback of the manager rule is that an affirmative
defense has already been established for employers when
employees do not utilize their employer’s internal investigation
mechanisms.155
Because solutions for employers, like the
Faragher/Ellerth defense, have been created by the Supreme
Court, excluding employees in a managerial position would
defeat the purpose of even having those employer defenses.156

149

See Dorrian, supra note 142.
See DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 423 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“Applying the ‘manager rule’ in the Title VII context would discourage these very
employees from voicing concerns about workplace discrimination and put in motion
a downward spiral of Title VII enforcement.”).
151
Id. at 423; see also Dorrian, supra note 142 (“[R]equiring [employees] to
choose between fulfilling their job duties and risking possible retaliation, or
remaining silent and risking possible employer discipline for failing to carry out
their job responsibilities.”).
152
DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423.
153
See cases cited supra note 88.
154
DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423; see also Tortifying Retaliation, supra note 39, at
1401 (“On the other hand, the manager rule tilts the scales all the way in the
opposite direction, causing a complete withdrawal of retaliation protection from the
employees assigned such job responsibilities, effectively removing them from Title
VII’s antiretaliation exception to employment at will.”).
155
DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 423.
156
See id.
150
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D. The Manager Rule Should Be Applied to Title VII Cases on a
Case-by-Case Analysis
Requiring employees to “step outside” their roles as
managers and file their own adverse action against their
employer or assist other employees in asserting their rights157 is
too high a burden to bear. Instead, future courts should look to
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosenfield for guidance in
applying the manager rule to retaliation claims under Title VII.
First, as mentioned in Rosenfield, the Supreme Court’s fair notice
rule established in Kasten should also be applied in the Title VII
context.158 Requiring that a complaint be clear and detailed will
assist employers in understanding their employee’s complaints
while simultaneously enabling employees to make those
complaints.
Second, to protect the interests of both employees and
employers, an employee’s managerial status should still be taken
into consideration in deciding whether he or she can bring a
retaliation claim under Title VII. One type of manager is not
present in all types of employment.159 Looking at the specific job
responsibilities and duties of the manager will help in deciding
whether he or she is filing a complaint under Title VII.160 For
example, an entry-level type manager may have the job
responsibilities of solely overseeing the normal daily operations
of a company and have no duties to report discrimination or
compliance with federal statutes.161 On the other hand, a higherlevel manager may be tasked with reporting such discrimination
claims and ensuring that the company is complying with statutes
such as the FLSA or Title VII.162 Therefore, courts should look at
the exact job responsibilities of the plaintiff as part of their
analysis.
Courts resolving retaliation claims under Title VII using a
case-by-case analysis, which analyzes the job responsibilities of
the employee and determines whether fair notice was given,
would benefit both employers and employees. First, by looking at

157

See, e.g., McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir. 1996).
Rosenfield v. Globaltranz Enters., 811 F.3d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 2015).
159
Id. at 287 (“Moreover, an employee’s status as a ‘manager’ is not entirely
binary.”).
160
See id. at 286.
161
Id. at 287.
162
Id.
158
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the job responsibilities of the plaintiff, courts could analyze
whether the employee is really opposing the conduct of the
employer that would make it oppositional, or whether the
employee is simply performing the designated duties of his or her
job description.163 Second, if an employee is in fact found to have
been opposing the conduct of an employer, the court could then
look to see whether the employment practice being opposed is
actually an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.164
To aid in the analysis of a manager’s retaliation claim under
Title VII, courts should adopt the fair notice rule established in
Kasten: A complaint must be clear and adequate so that a
reasonable employer would be able to understand that the
complaint is asserting rights that are protected by the statute
and that the complainant is “call[ing] for their protection.”165
Courts should also look to the guidance of Rosenfield and
consider the managerial status of employees as a significant
element of the case-by-case analysis.166 This type of analysis
would also benefit employers by potentially limiting the
“litigation minefield”167 that would ensue without the application
of some type of manager rule, while simultaneously allowing
employees to have their claims heard and recognized.
CONCLUSION
The manager rule should be applied to Title VII cases but in
a very specific context involving a case-by-case analysis, similar
to that of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Rosenfield v.
GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. With the rise in retaliation claims,
neither employees nor employers should have a significant
advantage over the other. On the one hand, the ability to file
claims for retaliation under Title VII should not be a more
onerous task for employees in a managerial role. They should
not have to demonstrate that they have stepped outside their
normal role of being a manager to an employee who has
personally filed an adverse employment action against their
employer. Doing so may discourage employees from voicing their
concerns about discrimination in the workplace.
163
164
165
166
167

See Dorrian, supra note 142.
See id.
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14 (2011).
Rosenfield, 811 F.3d at 286.
Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008).
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On the other hand, not having the manager rule apply to
Title VII cases would have employers potentially faced with
opening the floodgates of litigation with retaliation claims.
Employees could essentially be engaging in protected activity for
doing their normal job activities. Therefore, employers would
have a difficult time trying to discipline their employees for
reasons unrelated to their responsibilities of reporting job bias or
discrimination complaints.
There is a way to satisfy both parties. The proposed solution
of adopting the Supreme Court’s fair notice rule for complaints in
Kasten, considering the managerial status as only one part of the
context as established in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Rosenfield, and conducting a more detailed and factual analysis
would satisfy both employees and employers in relation to
retaliation claims under Title VII.

